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I. INTRODUCTION
At the request of Diversified Industries, Inc., a law firm conducted an
investigation of the corporation to uncover information regarding a "slush
fund" that the Diversified Board of Directors suspected was being used to
bribe purchasing agents of other businesses. The law firm presented the
Board of Directors with several reports of its investigation containing,
among other things, analyses of employee interviews and proposals for
action by the Board. Corporate minutes discussed the reports and the
proposals, and portions of those minutes, not including any part of the
reports, were distributed to stockholders. Attracted by litigation
surrounding a proxy fight within Diversified, the Securities and Exchange
Commission conducted an investigation and subpoenaed the law firm's
final report. Diversified subsequently provided the Commission with the
reports on a confidential basis. As a result of the publicity surrounding
these events, the Weatherhead Company sued Diversified for, among
other things, tortious interference with Weatherhead employees.
Weatherhead sought the law firm's reports to Diversified during pretrial
discovery, and a motion for production of the documents was granted. The
SEC maintained the confidentiality of the report, but Weatherhead
obtained a copy from an individual defendant who had settled out of court.
In Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,' the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in an en banc decision rejecting Weatherhead's demands,
adopted a new test for the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
context. The court abandoned the more widely used test-the control
group test formulated by the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.2 for a
modified version of a newer and less frequently used test first utilized by the
Seventh Circuit in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker.
3
The control group test limits the application of the attorney-client
privilege to legal communications between attorneys and those corporate
officers who are in a position to make discretionary decisions based on the
advice engendered by the communications. The Diversified court refused
1. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en band). For other articles dealing with this case, see Attorne)-
Client Privilege-Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith: New Rulesfor Apprlying the Privilege When
The Client Is a Corporation, 57 N.C.L. REv. 306 (1979); Note, The Corporate Attorne)-Client
Privilege-A Compromise Solution: Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, II CoNN. L. REv. 94
(1978); Rothstein, Attorney's Privileges Endangered by Three Recent Judicial Rulings, Legal Times of
Wash., Jan. 12,1979, at 13, col. I; Legal Times of Wash., Aug. 7,1978, at 2, col. 2; Matthews& Klein,
Lessons for Would-Be "Special Counsel"fron Diversified Industries Case, Legal Times of Wash.,
Tune 12, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
2. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962). See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596,602
(8th Cir. 1978).
3. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided Suprenie Court,400
U.S. 348 (1971).
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to so limit the privilege, choosing instead the Harper & Row test, which
extends the attorney-client privilege to legal communications in which the
employee communicating with the attorney is acting in the course of his
employment and at the direction of his superior. The Eighth Circuit,
however, modified this test by imposing five limitations, suggested in
Weinstein's Evidence,4 that are tailored to exclude routine reports, non-
legal advice, and fortuitous witnesses from the privilege.5 It further held
that communications with a lawyer were prima facie of a legal nature, and
that the party seeking discovery must make a clear showing to the contrary
to rebut this presumption.6 Applying this composite test to the case at bar,
the court found that interviews of corporate employees by a law firm
retained by the corporation to investigate wrongdoings and the resulting
report were shielded from discovery by the attorney-client privilege.
Furthermore, the court found that neither the inclusion of peripheral parts
of the report in the corporate minutes nor the private disclosure to the SEC
waived the privilege.
The following discussion will examine the recent history and status of
the attorney-client privilege at the federal level, and will explore the Eighth
Circuit's decision, its possible implications, and some alternative routes
the court might have chosen or may choose in the future.
II. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. General Principles
Courts first recognized the attorney-client privilege in the sixteenth
century. Originally, the privilege was based on the honor of the attorney-
it belonged to him and he alone could waive it.7 During the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, however, a new rationale of protecting the client
arose, shifting the possession, and thus the capacity to waive the privilege,
from the attorney to the client.8
The American Law Institute's rationale for the privilege is that:
In a society as complicated in structure as ours and governed by laws as
complex and detailed as those imposed upon us, expert legal advice is
essential. To the furnishing of such advice the fullest freedom and honesty of
communication of pertinent facts is a prerequisite. To induce clients to make
such communications, the privilege to prevent their later disclosure is said by
courts and commentators to be a necessity. The social good derived from the
4. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(b)[04] (1979) [hereinafter cited as
WEINSTEIN]; see note 78 and accompanying text infra.
5. 572 F.2d at 609.
6. Id. at 610.
7. 8 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2291, at 545 (rev. repl. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMOREJ; Pyc, Fundamentals ofthe
Attorney-Client Privilege, 15 PRAC. LAW. 15, 16 (1969).
8. Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826); Schwimmer v. United States, 232
F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
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proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their clients is
believed to outweigh the harm that may come from the suppression of the
evidence in specific cases.9
The common law structure of the privilege varies, but general
guidelines can be formulated. The privilege extends to communications
from client to attorney, or vice versa,'0 and includes all communications
that concern legal advice, whether or not made in anticipation of
litigation." The concept of a communication is to be interpreted broadly,
2
but the privilege extends only to the substance of the communications, not
to the existence of or incidents to the attorney-client relationship itself.'
3
The privilege remains intact against discovery even if the client is not a
party to the litigation.1 4 Confidentiality must exist actually and
intentionally at the inception of the communication, however, and remain
continuous throughout, or the privilege will be waived.15 Confidentiality
extends only to the privileged group, however defined, and one member of
this group may waive the privilege, 6 even if done so unintentionally. 7
As a general rule, waiver occurs when the policy underlying the rule
can no longer be served or when there is a voluntary act of disclosure.' 8
9. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 210, Comment a (1942).
10. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686,692-93 (10th Cir. 1968); Giordani v. Hoffmann, 278 F. Supp.
886,889 (E.D. Pa. 1968). But see Congoleum Indus. v. G A F Corp.,49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969), and
American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. DeL 1962) (no extension of the
privilege to opinions of counsel).
11. The attorney-client privilege should not be confused with the work product privilege
enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (now codified in FED. R. Civ. P. 26(bX3). In
pertinent part, the federal rules, which became effective in 1970, provide:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of
documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (bXl) of this rule
and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer,
or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of
such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney
or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). briefly, the work product privilege isaqualified privilege-allowing discovery
upon the showing of good cause-and thus is construed broadly. When subject and opinionated
material is sought, however, it is normally construed strictly. While the attorney-client privilege
belongs to the client, the work product privilege belongs to the attorney.
12. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633,637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
13. United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir. 1964).
14. Republic Gear Co. v. Borg Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967).
15. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970); United States
v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
16. American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962).
17. United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
18. Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970):
United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, (E.D. Mich. 1954). Seealso W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771, 775 (W.D. Okla. 1976). There is a dispute whether
communications between attorneys concerning a client are privileged. f. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v.
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Any lapse in confidentiality constitutes a waiver of the privilege.'9 Waiver
extends to all communications relating to a particular subject, even if only
part of those materials have been disclosed.2 ° Prima flcie evidence of fraud
vitiates the privilege,21 and there is no privilege solely for the purpose of
shielding documents in evasion of discovery.22
For the purpose of defining the privilege, the court in Diversified
followed the lead of some of the more recent decisions23 and seemingly
adopted Supreme Court Standard 503, a portion of the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence not approved by Congress. 24 The Standard reads in
part:
(a) (1) A "client" is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or
other organization or entity, either public or private, who is rendered
professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional legal services from him ...
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the lawyer in the
rendition of professional legal services.
(4) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition
of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for
the transmission of the communication.
(b) General rule of privilege-A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services
to the client, (1) between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his
lawyer's representative, or (2) between his lawyer and the lawyer's representa-
tive, or (3) by him or his lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter
of common interest, or (4) between representatives of the client or between
the client and a representative of the client, or (5) between lawyers repre-
senting the client.
United States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242 (1977) (consulting attorneys will not destroy
confidentiality, creating in essence a second level privilege); United States v. Covington & Burling, 430
F. Supp. 1117 (D.D.C. 1977) (not privileged unless client communication is revealed).
19. United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
20. Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974); Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974); In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation, 61
F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); WIGMIORE, supra note 7, § 2327 (the privilege may not be used as both it
sword and a shield).
21. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545, 548 (8th Cir.
1972); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974); WioMOR8, supra note 7,
§ 2298.
22. Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1969).
23. See In regrand jury proceedings, Detroit, Mich., 434 F. Supp. 648, 648 n.1 (E.D. Mich,
1977); Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (note I comments on the
appropriateness of the test asking, "what would be a more accurate expression of common law?");
McLaughlin, The Treatment of Attorney-Client and Related Privileges in the Proposed Rules of
Evidence for the United States District Courts, 26 TnE RECORD 30 (1971).
24. The en bane majority never explicitly adopted any definition of the attorney-client privilege.
It can be inferred from this that Judge Heaney is building upon his dissent from the panel opinion in
which he does use this test.
25. PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EvIDENCE rule 503, 56 F.R.D. 235, 235-36 (1973).
Vol. 40: 699
PRIVILEGES
B. Application of the Privilege to Corporations
It had been tacitly assumed for many years that the attorney-client
privilege applied to corporations. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
was the first to actually apply the privilege in favor of a corporation in
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association.26 The special issues
presented by the application of the privilege to the corporation concern the
definitions of "attorney," "legal advice," and "client." The first issue is that
of deciding which persons, from a collection of in-house and out-of-house
counsel, members and non-members of the state bar, and patent advisors
and business advisors, are to be designated attorneys for purposes of the
privilege. The second issue simply consists of separating legal from
nonlegal advice-a task conceptually simple but practically difficult when
dealing with an entity whose sole purpose for existence is economic gain
and whose every action is so directed. The third issue is determining which
agents of a corporation are so closely identified with it that their actions
would be considered those of the client corporation. These issues arise
primarily from two sources: the inherent conflict between any privilege and
the broad rules of discovery, and the difficulty of adapting a privilege
created for the individual to a corporation.
An attorney has been defined as one who is primarily employed giving
legal advice.27 Courts have been willing to attach the privilege to both in-
house and outside counsel.28 It is also well settled that bar membership is
not a prerequisite for the privilege to attach, especially for visiting counsel
or house counsel and for interstate corporations. 29 The primary
requirement is that the lawyer is acting in his capacity as a lawyer.3
Communications between privileged officers of the corporation are also
privileged if they deal with actual or proposed legal communications to an
attorney.3' If business advice is sprinkled in with the legal advice it will still
be privileged,32 but when the communication is primarily of a nonlegal
nature, it will not be privileged. 3
Because the requirement of confidentiality mandates secrecy, and the
finding of waiver requires the piercing of that secrecy, the test for agents of
26. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
27. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950); see also
WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, § 503[02].
28. American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962); Georgia-
Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950).
29. Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
30. Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
31. Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 37-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); see also PROPOSED
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 503(b), 56 F.R.D. at 236 (1973).
32. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Mass. 1950).
33. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954).
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the corporation in its role as a client is of critical importance in any finding
of fact. The initial and most widely used test for whether an individual is an
agent of the corporate client is the "control group" test, formulated by the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.34 In that case the court said:
Keeping in mind that the question is, Is it the corporation which is seeking the
lawyer's advice when the asserted privileged communication is made?, the
most satisfactory solution, I think, is that if the employee making the
communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a position to control or
even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the
corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized
member of a body or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or
personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and
the privilege would apply.3 5
Though adopted by many courts, 36 this test has been severely
criticized for its failure to take the realities of large corporate structures
into account. The test limits the privilege to a very restricted group of
decision makers, leaving out all corporate advisors and various
executives.37 The real failure of the test lies in its explicit attempt to equate
a corporation with an individual, without recognizing the specialization
and division of labor inherent in a large corporation. By so doing, it
virtually excludes all but a very few from the privilege. For instance, one
commentator asks: if an employee has the power to render a corporation
liable for damages, why should his communications to counsel not be
privileged?
38
The Seventh Circuit rejected the control group test in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,39 saying:
We conclude that an employee of a corporation, though not a member of
its control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his
communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the
employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the
corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is
34. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
35. Id. at 485.
36. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975); United States v. International Business
Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154,178 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R,D. 26 (D,
Md. 1974); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Congoleum
Indus., Inc. v. GA F Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Garrison v. Gen. Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp.
515 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
37. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1163-64 (D.S,C. 1974);
Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. LAw. 901 (1969). For tn
example of executives and advisors excluded, see Congoleum Indus., Inc. v, G A FCorp.,49 F.R.D. 82
(E.D. Pa. 1969).
38. McLaughlin, The Treatment of Attorney-Client and Related Privileges in the Proposed
Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 26 TimE RECORD 31, 33 (1971).
39. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff 'd without opinion by an equally divided Supreme Court,
400 U.S. 348 (1971).
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sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the
performance by the employee of the duties of his employment.40
The court further explained:
It is clear that we are not dealing in this case with the communications of
employees about matters as to which they are virtually indistinguishable from
bystander witnesses; employees who, almost fortuitously, observe events
which may generate liability on the part of the corporation. We express no
opinion with respect to communications by employees who fall in that class.4 t
The conflict between these two tests continues.42 The proponents of
the control group test state that the control group is in effect the client,43
that the test allows more open discovery,44 and that the ease of applying
and understanding the test creates a "bright-line" of protection more
consonant with the purposes of the privilege than the Harper & Row test.4 5
The proponents of the Harper & Row test argue that the control group test
is overly restrictive and impossible to apply to a large corporation; it must
either fail or be arbitrary.46 Yet many courts, showing a conservatism
echoing that of Judge Campbell in the first Radiant Burners decision 4 7
40. Id. at 491.
41- Id.
42. See In re Ampicilin Antitrust Litigation, 78-1 TRADE CAS.
62,043 (D.D.C. 1978); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974);
and note 83 infra In Duplan the court ostensibly chose the controlgroup test but in effect interpreted it
as the Harper & Row test, saying.
A corporation cannot deal solely through the chairman of the board ofdirectors. There
has to be a sufficient number of persons within a corporation who are authorized on behalfof
the corporation to seek advice, to give information with respect to the rendition ofadvice, and
to receive advice ...
This is an antitrust case. If the chairman of the board and the president ofa corporation
were to seek advice on antitrust law, the only way that a lawyer can really understand how a
corporation operates, what it is doing, and what it can do, within the confines of the antitrust
laws, is to go out into the branch offices and into the field to make the rounds with the
salesman. . . . if an attorney cannot make enquiries ofsalesmen and if the attorney cannot
give advice to the corporate personnel who will apply it, then a corporation would be
reluctant to seek legal advice since its confidential communications would not be protected by
the attorney-client privilege. . . . unless corporate personnel on a fairly low level can speak
to attorneys in confidence, the enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws is likely to be
adversely affected.
397 F. Supp. at 1164. See D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723,388 P.2d 700,36
Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964), foranother test. The California Court's test requires the "natural person" to be
speaking for the corporation, or the speaker's connection with the matter to have arisen out of his
employment in the ordinary course of business, or the communication to be at the direction of a
superior. For other proposed tests, see Simon, The Attornel,-Client Privilege as Applied to
Corporations, 65 YALE LJ. 953 (1956); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting:
A Suggested Approach, 69 MICH. L. REv. 360 (1970).
43. Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
44. Virginia Elec. and Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D.
Va. 1975).
45. Note, Attorney-Client Privilegefor Corporate Clients: 77ze Control Group Test, 84 HARv. L
REv. 424 (1970) (A "bright-line" test allegedly increases the predictability of the privilege, encouraging
more corporations to make use of it with confidence.).
46. Kobak, T'be Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the
Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REv. 339, 368 (1972).
47. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. IUl. 1962).
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reject the Harper & Row test using language similar to that of the Tax
Court in a recent case:
It would appear that the Harper & Row formula would exclude virtually
nothing from its sweep and flies in the face of the well-established principle
that the privilege "should be strictly confined with the narrowest possible
limits consistent with the logic of its principle." United States v. Goldfarb,
[328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir. 1964)].
It would also appear to open the door to the danger envisioned by the
Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, [329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947)]:
"Thus in a suit by an injured employee against a railroad or in a suit
by an insured person against an insurance company the corporate
defendant could pull a dark veil of secrecy over all the pertinent facts it
can collect after the claim arises merely on the assertion that such facts
were gathered by its large staff of attorneys and claim agents. 48
III. Diversified Industries v. Meredith
A. Facts and Background
Diversified Industries, a Delaware corporation, had for a number of
years sold large quantities of copper to the Weatherhead Company, an
Ohio corporation. In light of information appearing during several
shareholder suits against Diversified in 1974 and 1975, it appeared that
Diversified may have established and maintained a "slush fund" to bribe
purchasing agents of other businesses, including Weatherhead.
In the spring of 1975, the Board of Directors of Diversified decided to
employ the law firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering to investigate the
business practices of the corporation in light of the disclosures that had
been made during the shareholder's suits. A memorandum from the law
firm, directed to the Board and received in June 1975, outlined the method
of investigation and the extent to which the information would be immune
from disclosure.
In July 1975, Weatherhead commenced suit against Diversified,
alleging an unlawful conspiracy between Diversified and Weatherhead
employees, tortious interference with the contractual relationships
between Weatherhead and its employees, and violation of the Clayton
Antitrust Act.49 Meanwhile, the Securities and Exchange Commission was
attracted by the 1974-75 litigation and, in due course, conducted an official
investigation of the affairs of Diversified. It later filed suit for an injunction
against Diversified, and a consent decree was entered in that case in late
1976.
In December 1975, the law firm made a full and detailed report of the
investigation to the Diversified Board of Directors. The report gave the
substance of the law firm's interviews with Diversified's employees and
identified those who refused to give any information. The report also dealt
48. United States v. Upjohn Co., 78-1 U.S. TAX CAS.
9277, at 83,602 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
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with the accounting aspect of the investigation, which had been handled by
the accounting firm of Arthur Anderson & Co. The report evaluated the
information and stated the conclusions and recommendations of both the
law firm and the accounting firm to Diversified. Certain corporate minutes
and part of an intracorporation letter restated critical portions of the
report. 50 Weatherhead sought to obtain these materials by pretrial
interrogatories and a motion for production of the documents. Diversified
objected, arguing that the documents fell within the scope of the attorney-
client privilege.
B. Factual Caveat
The Diversified opinion is in some places confusing or vague because
of factual inconsistencies and analytical omissions. The inconsistencies
were undoubtedly caused both by the comparatively short period of time
allowed for the filing of the briefs?' and by changes in the factual situation
as the litigation progressed and the opinions were written. The omissions
were most likely refusals of the court to decide more than actually needed.
The most cryptic aspect of the opinion deals with what was referred to
in various parts of the opinion as the "serious question of mootness" 52 or
"the change in circumstances in the litigation."53 The dissenting opinions
of Judge Henley and Judge Bright both referred to disclosures made by the
SEC to Weatherhead of the Diversified report, 54 while Judge Heaney
referred to a disclosure without mentioning the source.55 While the
majority held that the "litigants are not foreclosed from obtaining the same
information from non-privileged .sources,"56 it refused to dismiss the
petition on grounds of mootness.
This presents two problems-one factual and one analytical. The
opinions are plainly wrong factually. The report was submitted to the SEC
by Diversified without restrictions.58 The SEC, however, wished to keep it
confidential for policy reasons. 59 This was an allowable exception to the
Freedom of Information Act as an ongoing investigation by a government
agency. 60 Although certain disclosures were made by Diversified via a
50. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 600-01, 607 (8th Cir. 1978).
51. Id. at 599.
52. Id. at 612.
53. Id. at 617.
54. Id. at 612, 617.
55. Id. at 611 n.6.
56. Id. at 611.
57. Id. n.6.
58. Telephone interviews with Mr. Hal D. Cooper of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue in Cleveland,
Ohio (Jan. 24,1979), and with Mr. Walter M. Clark ofArmstrong, Teasdale, Kramer & Vaughan in St.
Louis, Mo. (Feb. 28, 1979). Seealso Memorandum of The Weatherhead Co. in Opposition to Writ of
Mandumus at 8-9.
59. Boeing Consent Order. No. 78-1383 (D.D.C. July 28,1978). See note 129 and accompanying
text infra.
60. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2) (1976).
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public 10-K filing with the SEC,61 the SEC never released the report.62 A
copy of the report, however, was given to Weatherhead by one of the
individual defendants as part of an out-of-court settlement. 3
The various opinions do not clear up the matter at all, with off-the-
cuff remarks concerning mootness in interplay with the clear holding that
"non-privileged sources" are fair game for discovery. The principal cause
of this confusion is the court's failure to distinguish between the effect of
the privilege upon discovery in contrast to the effect upon the admissibility
of the communication as evidence in trial. The attorney-client privilege is
normally one that only extends to discovery,64 but Judge Heaney's
discussions of limited waiver,65 as well as his seeming adoption of a rule
excluding testimony of eavesdroppers, 6 brings the scope of the privilege
into question.67
These observations are only peripherally relevant to the major
portions of the opinions and will be treated in their respective places in this
paper. Nevertheless, the reader should take note of Judge Henley's
statement in his dissent that
[i]n another factual setting I would have no trouble agreeing with much of
what is said by way of principle in the opinion of the court. As it is, I am of the
view that the majority's holding on the issue of attorney-client privilege
simply is not geared to the facts of the instant case. 8
C. Preliminary Holdings
The appeal was first heard by a three judge panel of the Eighth Circuit,
which, although holding that mandamus was an appropriate avenue for
appellate review,69 denied the petition in full in an opinion by Judge
Henley. Judge Heaney filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. The
decision was reversed in part on hearing en banc-Judge Heaney
delivering the four to three decision.
The court en banc upheld Judge Henley's rejection of Diversified's
request for the work product privilege. Although the court recognized that
the work product privilege is to be applied to a broad range of subject
matter because it is a qualified privilege, and though the contents of the
report definitely constituted the law firm's work product, the court found
61. Memorandum of the Weatherhead Co., supra note 58.
62. Telephone Interviews, supra note 58.
63. Id.
64. WIGMORE, supra note 7, §§ 2325-26, at 633-34 (waiver will be found even if involuntary or by
theft, etc.).
65. 572 F.2d at 604, 611. See text accompanying note 118 infra.
66. PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 503, 56 F.R.D. at 238 (1973) (Advisory
Committee's Note).
67. See Judge Henley's observation that "[]t may be doubted that the report itself would be
adniissible in evidence at a trial . . ." 572 F.2d at 601.
68. Id. at 616.
69. Id. at 599, 604, 607, 611.
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the report to be not privileged because it was not done in anticipation of
litigation as that phrase is used in rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.70 The two opinions also agreed in upholding the district court's
denial of the privilege for the preliminary memorandum of June 1975,
which outlined the scope and method of the investigation. The court
concluded that the memorandum was clearly not privileged because it
revealed no confidential information; the memorandum merely described
the relationship between the law firm and Diversified.73
The question of mootness was only briefly addressed by the en bane
majority, which stated in a footnote:72 "On remand, the District Court may
determine what further action, if any, is appropriate in the light of this
Court's holding that the report is privileged. 73 Apparently the majority
did not hold that the issue was not moot; rather it was remanding the
dispute to the district court for that court's determination of fact in light of
the decision of the higher court. This was an adoption of the appellant's
argument "that the issue which may be at stake in later proceedings, when
properly defined, will not be one of 'mootness' but rather that of waiver,
and will be in the District Court only after the issue of privilege is decided
here."74
D. Client Test
In addressing the core of the attorney-client privilege, the Diversified
court first adopted a rule of broad applicability of the privilege and then
restricted and somewhat obscured the boundaries of that applicability.
This was accomplished by adopting a modified version of the Harper &
Row test 75 to identify the group of corporate agents who were to be
shielded by the privilege. The court stated that, in its original form, the test
extended the privilege to those situations in which "the employee makes
the communication at the direction of his superiors . ..and where [the]
subject matter .. . in the communication is [within] the performance by
the employee of the duties of his employment. '76 The Diversified court
noted, however, that critics of the test had argued that many corporations
would attempt to funnel most corporate communications through their
attorneys in order to prevent subsequent disclosure.77 To prevent such an
abuse of the privilege, the court restricted the Harper & Row test by
70. Id. at 604; see note I I supra.
71. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633,636 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963);
Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 214-15 (N.D. Iil. 1972).
72. 572 F.2d at 611 n.6.
73. Id.
74. Reply of Counsel for Petitioner Diversified Industries, Inc., to Dec.30,1977, Letter from the
Clerk of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals at 3 (Jan. 9, 1978).
75. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491,(7thCir. 1970),aif'd without
opinion by an equally divided Supreme Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
76. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 608 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
77. Id. at 609.
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adopting several limitations of the subject matter and confidentiality
suggested by Judge Weinstein:
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2)
the employee making the communication did so at the direction of his
corporate superior; (3) the superior made the request so that the corporation
could' secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is
within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the communica-
tion is not disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate
structure, need to know its contents. We note, moreover, that the corporation
has the burden of showing that the communication in issue meets all of the
above requirements.
78
The Diversified court, however, qualified the corporation's burden of
proof. In providing a touchstone for the ambiguous first requirement-
that the communication be made for the purpose of securing legal advice-
the court deferred to the language of Dean Wigmore:
It is not easy to frame a definite test for distinguishing legalftom nonlegal
advice. . . .The most that can be said by way of generalization is that a
matter committed to a professional legal adviser isprimafacie so committed
for the sake of the legal advice which may be more or less desirable for some
aspect of the matter, and is therefore within the privilege unless it clearly
appears to be lacking in aspects requiring legal advice. Obviously, much
depends upon the circumstances of individual transactions.79
This composite test is a new synthesis. Although the standards are all
borrowed, none were ever popular, nor were they ever combined as they
were in Diversified. The complexity of Judge Weinstein's conditions and
their susceptibility to subjective application constitute a rebellion against
the mainstream school of simplicity and objectivity." The Harper & Row
test had been available for eight years, yet few courts were willing to use
it.8' For, like the prima facie assumption of legal advice, it flies in the face of
the conservative attitude of the majority of courts that the privilege,
because absolute, should be strictly construed.82
Not only is the composite test subject to arguments against its breadth
and subjectivity, but it also has the potential of failing mechanically from
an overly narrow interpretation. The second of Weinstein's limitations
(also part of the Harper & Row test)-that the employee making the
communication do so at the direction of his corporate superior-has the
potential of limiting the privilege as strictly as or even more strictly than
78. Id., citing WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 503(b)[04].
79. 572 F.2d at 610, quoting WIGNMORE, supra note 7, § 229b (emphasis by court),
80. See cases cited in note 36 supra. But see Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp.
1146 (D.S.C. 1974).
81. See, e.g., Note, supra note 45. See generally Kobak, The Uneven Application of the
Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. Rav. 339 (1972).
82. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596,612(8th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (Henley, J.,
dissenting), citing Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314,323 (7th Cir. 1963). See
also WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2291 ("Nevertheless the privilege remains an exception .. .
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the control group test. In fact, if this requirement were read in a very
limited sense, it might even exclude a peripheral member of the control
group who was not acting on the explicit order of his superior. For
example, one who was in a "position to take a substantial part in a
decision" could yet have superiors. Acting without their explicit direction
could vitiate the privilege due to this requirement. A department head
might not conduct an investigation on his own. Control group
management might not act without direction from the board of directors.
By not specifying what is meant by "corporate superior," this requirement
reductio ad absurdem could even limit the privilege solely to actions
originating from the chairman of the board of directors. A strict reading of
Weinstein's second limitation could result in this test being more restrictive
than a liberal reading of the control group test-which does allow
extending the privilege to any employee acting as an agent of the control
group. 8
3
Weinstein's fifth requirement-that the communication not be
disseminated beyond those persons who because of the corporate structure
need to know its contents-creates some problems with good faith
compliance. Which officers in a corporation truly need to know the legal
business of areas outside their own special interests? Although the
Diversified court extended the privilege to the corporate minutes, it is
likely that not all those present at the meeting were persons with a
compelling "need to know." Yet how may a corporation formulate any
large-scale policy without an airing of the problem at a board of directors
meeting? It is possible, even probable from the court's actions in this fact
situation, that absent any unusual circumstances, the privilege will
normally be extended to internal disclosures within the ordinary course of
business. Due to the language of this requirement, however, this
conclusion is not incontrovertible.8 4
This broad range of possible interpretations could destroy the value of
the composite test. Were corporations to view this test narrowly and some
courts to interpret it broadly, the legal system would be cut by both edges
of the sword. A corporation fearing the possibility of a narrow
interpretation would not communicate as freely with its counsel. On the
83. For a broad reading of the control group test, see Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164-65 (D.S.C. 1974). This composite test has been criticized recently by the court
in In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 78-1 TRADE CAS. 62,043 (D.D.C. 1978). This court rejected
the control group test and the Harper & Row test. Rather than base its test upon the requirement of a
directive from a superior to an employee (as in Diversified), the Anipicillin court required that the
communication be "reasonably believed to be necessary to the decision-making process concerning a
problem on which legal advice was sought." Id. at 74,510 (emphasis in original). This test is more
closely tailored and conceptually a better test than the composite test here, but it could present some
difficult problems in application due to its reliance upon the necessary evaluation of the employee's
intent See also D. I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723,388 P.2d 700,36 Cal. Rptr.
468 (1964) (the "natural person" test).
84. The other numbered requirements are relatively pointless and hopefully harmless.
Requirements one and four are superfluous given the definition of the privilege adopted by the court.
Requirement three follows naturally from requirements one and two when read together.
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other hand, an expansive interpretation of the privilege would increase its
effect as an obstacle to truthfinding in the courtroom.
In his dissent, Judge Henley objected to allowing a prima facie
assumption that the communications were for legal advice, arguing that
the majority was extending Wigmore's language beyond reasonable
limits.8 5 This is a weak objection. Although the majority's burden of a
"clear showing" is greater than that normally used to satisfy a burden of
production, due to the difficulty (particularly acute in a business context)
of identifying advice solely legal in character, the barrier must be raised
high enough that a legitimate and substantial argument is needed for
disclosure. To hold otherwise could open the path to frivolous or blind
requests for any legal communication by the adverse party. Although any
request is in a sense blind until the material is discovered, the burden on the
"blind" party is not so great that he cannot feel his way. All legal rules exact
a price. After all, though such forays are not prohibited, the privilege is not
constructed with primary deference to "fishing expeditions."86 In any case,
the burden of proof that the elements of privilege were satisfied rests upon
the party seeking protection, and in camera review is available when
necessary. The burden on the party seeking disclosure is light enough to
ensure that the privilege is not so formidable that it will eliminate
disclosure when merited.
A substantial difficulty with the composite test is the court's attitude
toward the concept of the fortuitous witness-employees who by chance
observe events that may generate liability on the part of the corporation,87
or those who have no need to know the substance of a communication, yet
do know it.88 The Harper & Row court expressed no opinion with respect
to the fortuitous witness.8 9 On the one hand, section 503(b) of the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence-apparently adopted by the
Diversified court°-abandons the position that an eavesdropper may
testify to overheard privileged information.9'
On the other hand, Weinstein's fifth limitation-that the communica-
tion not be "disseminated beyond those persons who . . . need to know
its contents"-gives the impression that the fortuitous witness who had no
specific "need to know" the contents of the communication would not be
subject to theprivilege. This interpretation hinges upon whether the word
85. 572 F.2d at 613.
86. Great deference is not given to one attempting to find a wrong, that is, not seeking to redress a
wrong reasonably believed to have occurred. Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602,607-08 (2d Cir, 1972), But
cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("No longer can the time honored cry of'fishing
expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponents' case,"),
87. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d at 491.
88. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
89. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d at 491.
90. 572 F.2d at 605. No mention is made of the actual test used in the full en banc opinion, See
note 24 supra.
91. PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 503, 56 F.R.D. at 238 (1973) (Advisory
Committee's Note, subdivision (b)).
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"dissemination" is interpreted as including an element of intent, and
whether the phrase "need to know" is interpreted narrowly.
There is no good reason to find waiver of a privilege simply because
there existed a limited breach of confidentiality with a party who works in
close proximity to one to whom the privilege attaches. The purpose of the
privilege is to maximize the free flow of information within a corporation
with the minimum adverse effect upon discovery. This rule would
ostensibly charge a corporation with a strict task of secrecy-probably
much more strict than most corporations are able to practice. If this rule
were strictly interpreted, it would be difficult to employ; if loosely
interpreted, it would be ambiguous. The privilege attempts to perform its
function by instilling some sense of security in the client with respect to his
communications. The threat of discovery from mistake or mere
happenstance reduces this security considerably, constricting the primary
goal of the privilege. A rule that is arbitrary or ambiguous is more likely to
reduce the free flow of information from the fear of a rare leak than it is to
increase discovery from that same rare leak. Although Wigmore states that
the costs of the privilege are concrete and the benefits are questionable,92
the costs are incurred sporadically while the benefits accrue daily. While in
a rare case discovery will be maximized by the happenstance of a fortuitous
witness, in every case a great reduction of internal communication will
result from the corporation's extreme care to guard against that fortuitous
witness.
It is doubtful, however, that the composite test could be given a
restrictive reading. The context in which the test was formulated, in terms
of the opinions of both Judge Henley and Judge Heaney, and the context
of the formulation of Weinstein's tests, would encourage a broad reading.
Weinstein's limits were explicitly created to provide safeguards, thus
encouraging use of the broader Harper & Row test and hopefully
supplanting the narrow and often arbitrary control group test.93 Judge
Heaney echoed the criticism that the control group test equates the
corporation with the individual and fails to account for the realities of the
corporate structure that require confidential knowledge to be widely
disseminated. The largest corporations have the greatest need of counsel
due to their internal complexity. Yet because of the great number of
employees of these corporations, they are afforded the least protection by
the control group test. These corporations, in particular, are difficult to
police externally due to great internal complexity. Self-policing appears
more favorable simply because of cost. Although the more extensive
discovery possible under the control group test might reveal more useful
information in the short run, sources of material created by the defendant
corporations and available for discovery would dry up as these firms
recognized the danger of the use of legal communications and internal
92. WIGMoRI, supra note 7, § 2291.
93. WEINSMIN, supra note 4, 503(b)[04].
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policing. This would leave the legal system with information available for
use by neither the corporations nor their potential adversaries. A broad
interpretation of the attorney-client privilege is thus necessary if the
existence of information possessed by the defendant corporation alone is
to be preferred to the existence of no information at all.
The positive arguments for the composite test are persuasive only if
the test is given a broad interpretation that expands the protection
afforded the corporation by the privilege. Although the court did not
expressly incorporate this consideration into its test, -the availability of the
information from other sources influenced its decision.94 Corporate
policing of internal affairs should be protected, particularly when the raw
research data (e.g., employee interviews) collected is available to other
parties through other avenues (e.g., depositions).95 A broad scope for the
corporate attorney-client privilege, such as that provided by the
Diversified court, will facilitate self-policing. Denial of the protection will
correspondingly discourage it. Judge Heaney, quoting the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, argued that "rules of evidence should not
result in discouraging communications to lawyers made in a good faith
effort to promote compliance with the complex laws governing corporate
activity."96 If this objective becomes a part of the composite test, this test
could prove adequate in encouraging the free flow of information to and
from the corporation's counsel, in spite of the availability of ostensibly
strict limitations.
E. Waiver
1. Disclosure of the Report to the SEC
Waiver affects the attorney-client privilege's element of confidentiali-
ty. Confidentiality is considered necessary; any justification for the
privilege disappears without it. If the matter is never intended to be
confidential, the privilege will never attach, even if there exists
confidentiality in fact, again because the justification for the privilege is
absent. Thus, the abandonment of confidentiality is not necessarily a post
facto waiver, but in truth may be merely an indication that no
confidentiality was ever intended. A breach of confidentiality may also be a
result of the erosion over time of the necessity of the privilege or a result of
94. 572 F.2d at 611.
95. It is questionable how appropriate this observation is to the particular case. Of eight
Diversified employees interviewed by Weatherhead, five claimed the self-incrimination privilege, and
the other three professed ignorance to anything of substance. Memorandum of the Weatherhead Co. in
Opposition to Writ of Mandamus at 6-7 n.l. It has been suggested that the courts need not protect the
communications of lower level employees since this will have no effect upon their lucidity. Having no
control over the privilege themselves, the lower employees will be no more likely to talk with the
privilege than without. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir, 1979). This view,
however, ignores the fact that it is the employer who conducts the interviews, and it is the employer's
effort that needs encouragement.
96. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON FED. COURTS OF THE NEw YORK COUNTY LAWYERS ASS'N 7-10
(1970), reprinted in WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 503[01J, at 503-12 n.I.
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the privilege encompassing evidence of greater benefit to its possessor than
his opponent. These last two would be bona fide waivers.
Opposed to this strict construction of the attorney-client privilege is
the policy of encouraging compliance with government regulatory
agencies. To lubricate the regulatory process, courts have been reluctant to
impose any excess burdens on corporations voluntarily complying with
orders of the SEC, the IRS, and other government agencies. Likewise,
when possible, these agencies use non-public actions to encourage
disclosure with the least friction.
Suspended between these two policies hangs the basic factual
determination whether a "voluntary disclosure" exists in a particular case.
In question is whether a contested response to a court-ordered subpoena is
voluntary (or perhaps the question concerns the degree of voluntariness),97
and whether a private disclosure is truly an adequate disclosure for
purposes of waiving or destroying the privilege.
Prior to Weatherhead's suit against Diversified, the report had been
surrendered without contest to the SEC pursuant to an agency subpoena.
Whether this limited disclosure constituted a waiver of the privilege was an
important issue with which the court dealt rather lightly. Perhaps this is
excusable in consideration of the scarcity of any holdings dealing with
waiver of the attorney-client privilege in response to a government
subpoena. Since the two opinions most directly on point reached opposite
results, however, it would have been helpful for the court to explain its
position. 98
The first of these two cases, both of which were cited by Judge Heaney
without comment, is Bucks County Bank and Trust Co. v. Storck." The
court's explicit holding in that case was that testimony that would
otherwise be protected by the attorney-client privilege,
given by a client at a hearing, whereby the client defendant by motion seeks
the return of property taken from him by an alleged illegal search and seizure,
is given for the purpose of such motion, alone, and does not constitute a
general waiver of privilege by the client defendant, and it is equally clear that
such evidence is not usable against the defendant even in the criminal case in
chief in connection with which a return of property orsuppression of evidence
is sought.'00
97. Weatherhead argued that Diversified should have asserted its privilege against the SEC.
Memorandum of the Weatherhead Co. in Opposition to Writ of Mandumus at 29 n.6 ("The attorney-
client privilege, if properly asserted, can be raised before that Commission or any otheragencyjustas
it may be in ajudicial proceeding.").See SEC v. First Security Bank of Utah, 447 F.2d 166(10th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038 (1972); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962).
98. These two opinions are In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 453
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) and Bucks County Bank and Trust Co. v. Storck,297 F. Supp. 1 122(D. Hawaii 1969).
They address the issue of whether material is privileged by the attorney-client privilege pursuant to a
court-ordered subpoena. Generally, other cases deal with this problem only in the context of the self-
incrimination privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir.), vacatedon other
grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961).
99. 297 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Hawaii 1969).
100. Id. at 1123.
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The numerous qualifications in this language indicate that the Hawaiian
court was restricting the holding to the particular facts in that case.
Although this case could possibly stand for the proposition that there is
either no waiver or a nongeneral waiver because of disclosure in a
preceding hearing, most likely the court intended no more than the
expansion of the defendant's fourth amendment rights.
In In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litigation,10' the attorney
for the defendant disclosed otherwise privileged material of a third party to
the SEC with the approval of that third party. Though the third party was
not a party to the instant action, the court for the southern district of New
York ordered the material to be disclosed. The court stated: "[We] must
reject defendant's contention that the kind of disclosure that we are
confronted with-i.e., one made during a nonpublic SEC investigation-
does not effect a waiver of the attorney-client privilege."'0 2 Although the
defendant argued that this decision would make witnesses less willing to
cooperate with authorities, the court held this was "art inadequate basis for
a court to break new legal ground against the overwhelming weight of
authority."'3 Strangely enough the court made this bold statement
without citing a single case. Although one sentence later the court cited
several cases supporting the proposition that the privilege cannot be
selectively waived, °4 it gave neither rationale nor authority for calling a
non-public disclosure either a waiver or a selective waiver.
Both the Penn Central and the Diversified opinions found the
disclosures to the SEC to be voluntary. The Diversified court, however,
indicated that the non-public aspect of the hearing caused this to be only a
limited waiver.'0 5 The court did not clearly explain what it meant by
"limited waiver."
This finding is questionable only because the confidentiality of the
SEC proceedings is for the benefit of the SEC and not for the witnesses
appearing before it.'0 6 Thus, it would seem that the privilege belongs to the
101. 61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).
102. Id. at 464.
103. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
104.
See, e.g., Lee Nat'1 Corp. v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Del. 1970). ("It would be
patently unfair for a client to disclose those instances which please him and withhold all other
occasions."); United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184, 191 (S.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd per
curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957) ("The privilege once waived cannot be regained . . ,"); United
States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461,464-65 (E.D. Mich. 1954) ("If the client
waives the privilege at a first trial, he may not claim it at a subsequent trial, because after the
first publication the communication is no longer confidential and there is no reason for
recognizing the privilege."); United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734,742 (S.D. Cal. 1953)
("[W]hen the client and attorney themselves, for purposes beneficial to the client, lift the veil,
they cannot lower it again.").
Id. n.26 (in full).
105. This is somewhat in conflict with a previous opinion of the same court, holding that a
disclosure in prior proceedings under subpoena waives the attorney-client privilege for confidential
communications. Steen v. First Nat'l Bank, 298 F. 36, 41. (8th Cir. 1924). The Steen case, however,
involved the same action-not two separate actions.
106. LaMorte v. Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 40: 699
1979] PRIVILEGES
SEC and does not remain solely with the original claimants. If the SEC
proceedings are private pursuant to regulations or even policy, however,
the option to disclose is limited. In the case of Diversified's disclosures to
the SEC, amendments to The Freedom of Information Act passed
pursuant to The Privacy Act of 1974107 exempted the SEC from forced
disclosure and would arguably remove the option to disclose entirely.10t
Without that option, the control of the privilege rests with the original
claimants.'0 9 In any case, the SEC favors maintaining confidentiality., 0
Two months after the Diversified opinion was handed down, the
District Court for the Western District of Michigan decided the case of
United States v. Upjohn,"' which had virtually the same fact pattern as
Diversified. The court adopted the findings of a United States Magistrate,
who, using the control group test, found that no privilege existed-and
had it existed, it would have been waived by disclosures to the SEC and to
the IRS. The magistrate did not elaborate upon the concept of waiver;
rather he cited a number of cases and included a few quotations with little
comment. Most notably, he did not distinguish between the disclosure to
the disinterested SEC and that to the party seeking disclosure: the IRS. He
merely stated that disclosure to both the SEC and the IRS waives the
privilege. Whether disclosure to either waives the privilege is not clear.
The cases cited by the magistrate offer little instruction with regard to
the disclosure to the SEC. The quotations from Duplan Corp. v. Deering
107. 5 U.S.C. § 552aGX2)(1970).
108. This is a contested matter, although it seems that the agency retains control. See Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979). See also Huffman, No On Knows Who Mon 'Chrysler' Case,
Legal Times of Wash., April 23, 1979, at 1, col. 2. Cf.:"A disclosure which is itself privileged ... by
the common law . . . or by lawful contract, shall not constitute a waiver." Wearly v. FTC, 462 F.
Supp. 589, 597 (D.NJ. 1978); WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 511[02], at 511-6.
109. Diversified referred the court to Boehm v. United States, 123 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1941),
where the Eighth Circuit commented that"fthe Securities and Exchange Commission ...performs
a function similar to that of a grand jury." Id. at 808. Diversified then argued that the rationale which
underlies the maintenance of the privilege before the grand jury would uphold itin this casealso. Reply
Brief of Petitioner Diversified Industries, Inc. at 17. This is a non sequitur. Diversified was fully able to
assert the privilege before the SEC, yet failed to do so. Neithershould thisanalogyaid Diversified with
regard to waiver, since the attorney-client privilege generally occupies a status before a grand jury no
different than elsewhere. See, e.g., United Statesv. Calandra,414 U.S. 338,346 (1974). Courts may find
a waiver in a grand jury proceeding sooner than in other proceedings. In re Wciss, 596 F.2d 1185,1186
(4th Cir. 1979) ("Since Diversified did not require judicial intervention in the grand jury process, wedo
not find it to be controlling here."). See also In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.R.D.
453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
110. See note 130 and accompanying text infra.
111. 78-1 U.S. TAx CAs. 9277 (W.D. Mich. 1978). The United States Magistrate received a
copy of the Diversified opinion shortly after submitting his recommendation to the district court. After
reviewing the opinion, he reaffirmed his conclusions of his earlier report to the district court. Letter
from Stephen W. Kerr, United States Magistrate, to The Honorable Noel P. Fox, Chief Judge,
Western District of Michigan (Mar. 13, 1978). The district court also reconsidered the opinion,
rejecting the Diversified view. 78-1 U.S. TAX CAs. 9437. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the district court with regard to the "control group" test, stating that a subject matter test would
encourage purposeful ignorance of unpleasant facts by control group management. 79-2 U.S. TAX CAs.
9457, at 87,68 1. The case was remanded to the district court, however, to uphold the privilege when
control group communications were involved. Id. at 87,682. Waiver was held to apply only to the facts
actually disclosed to the SEC. Id. at 87,681 n.12. This of course destroys any concept of partial
disclosure so roundly criticized by the magistrate. See this notesupra. At the same time no mention was
made of any disclosure to the party at suit. See this note supra.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Millikin, Inc. and Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corp. merely condemn
selective disclosure." 2 United States v. Cote... held that the workpapers of
an accountant carry no privilege when used for filing amended returns.
This also was merely a case of selective disclosure to the party seeking
discovery. The cases of United States v. Schoeberlein114 and B & C
Trucking Co. v. Holmes & Narver, Inc.'"5 were cited by the magistrate as
standing for the proposition that disclosure to a gove:rnment agency waives
the privilege. The last two cases, however, are not on point.
In B & C Trucking, the disclosure to the Atomic Energy Commission
was not pursuant to a contract, regulation, request, or subpeona. I6 This is
certainly not analogous to a disclosure pursuant to a subpoena, as in
Diversified and Upjohn. The magistrate stated that in the Schoeberlein
case the disclosure to the Federal Communication Commission waived the
attorney-client privilege with regard to the IRS. In actuality, however, the
court in Schoeberlein considered the privilege waived not because of the
previous disclosure to the FCC, but because of a previous disclosure to the
opposing party in the suit: the IRS. ' 7 Thus, although there is some
precedent for allowing disclosure to the IRS pursuant to a previous
disclosure, the magistrate made no effort to distinguish between disclosure
to a third-party agency pursuant to its request and disclosure to an agency
that is a party to the action, or to an agency pursuant to no solicitation.
The Diversified opinion is really no clearer than the Upjohn opinion.
The former uses the term "limited waiver" without clarification. Judge
Heaney, in his dissent from the panel court opinion, would have limited the
waiver to the particular proceeding. His en banc opinion does not
explicitly adopt this position; rather he cites the cases he cited in his panel
dissent as basic source material."1 8 These two cases--Buck's County Bank
& Trust Co. v. Storck" 9 and United States v. Goodman "-limit the
waiver to the proceeding concerned. This would be a drastic broadening of
the privilege, however, allowing the client to assert the privilege against an
agency to which a disclosure had previously been made. 21 As noted
112. 78-1 U.S. TAX CAS. 19277, at 83,603, citing Duplan Corp. v. Decring Milliken, Inc., 397 F.
Supp. 1146, 1162 (D.S.C. 1974); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 46 (D. Md. 1974),
See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
113. 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972).
114. 335 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Md. 1971).
115. 39 F.R.D. 317 (D. Hawaii 1966).
116. Id. at 319.
117. United States v. Schoeberlein, 335 F. Supp. 1048, 1057 (D. Md. 1971).
118. See THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION, A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION rule 2'3
(12th ed. 1976).
119. 297 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Hawaii 1969).
120. 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961).
121. Waiver of the self-incrimination privilege has traditionally been limited to the proceeding
involved. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 132, at 281-82 (2d ed. Cleary ed. 1972),
With regard to the attorney-client privilege, it is clear that the waiver extends to the entire proceeding.
Id. 93, at 196-97; WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2328, at 638. It is not clear that it is waived for subsequent
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earlier, the Buck's County Bank holding was limited to a very narrow
factual situation,12 2 while the Goodman case dealt with the privilege
against self-incrimination. 2 3 Both of these cases were criminal in nature,
and the privilege was asserted against the government. Clearly different
considerations were present, since the considerable protection provided to
a defendant in a criminal trial is not necessarily appropriate in a civil suit.
Further, these cases dealt with the criminal issue of admissibility rather
than the civil issue of discovery. The Diversified court did not address the
distinctions among these issues. It did, however, decline to dismiss the
petition on grounds of mootness even after the petitioner obtained a copy
of the report. 24 Thus, the court could be viewing the privilege in the
context of admissibility,2 5 but as this was not expressly stated, it can be
assumed that mootness was discarded on other grounds. Otherwise, a
reading of the privilege as applying primarily to admissibility coupled with
a severely limited Buck's County Bank waiver theory would make the
privilege dangerously invulnerable.
It would be difficult to extend the court's holding further without an
explicit indication by the court of such an intention, as this would be a
radical departure from the traditional bounds of the privilege. The most
likely interpretation of the term "limited waiver" is that a waiver was
effected exclusively with the SEC. This would be in accord with
Schoeberlein and Cote. If the Upjohn opinion is read as limiting the waiver
to the IRS alone, that case would also be in accord. The quality of the
waiver might also be given different effect depending upon such variables
as whether the present or preceding action was civil or criminal in nature,
whether the waiver was toward an agency of the government or a private
party, whether the disclosure was made pursuant to a court order, or
whether that order was contested. Thus, a disclosure to a government
proceedings. Wigmore and McCormick both state that the privilege should be waived, but little
authority can be found for their position. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2328, at 638-39; MCco.LMscK,
supra, § 93, at 197. The rationale for this is simply an extension of the doctrine that disclosure to any
third person waives the privilege. Id.
122. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
123. 289 F.2d at 256.
124. 572 F.2d at 611 n.6. See generally text at III(B), (C).
125. There is considerable authority for the proposition that unauthorized disclosure of a
document does not waive the privilege. In this respect, the privilege has elements of a rule of
admissibility. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co.,466 F. Supp. 863,869 (D. Minn.
1979) (information disclosed by defecting member of organization does not waive privilege for
documents including such information); Liggett v. Glenn, 51 F. 381, (8th Cir. 1892) (document
obtained by loss or other means by third party or adversary is privileged); Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v.
Big Dutchman, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (attorney may not waive the privilege
without the client's authority to do so); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 57,64
(N.D. Ohio 1964) ("only the client can unseal his attorney's lips"). Some legal scholars have also
adopted the view that the obtaining of privileged attorney-client communications by unknown means
without the consent of the party asserting the privilege does not constitute a waiver of the privilege. See
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE S OF EVIDENCE rule 503, 56 F.R.D. at 238 (1973) (Advisory Committee's
Note, subdivision (a)(4); WEiNsTEiN, supra note 4, 503(b) [02], at 503-35; MCCORMICK, supra note
121, § 75; UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 26. See also note 91 and accompanying text supra. ln see
WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2325, at 633.
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agency pursuant to a subpoena might waive the privilege in all subsequent
civil actions with that agency, yet not waive the privilege toward the world
at large, or in a subsequent criminal action brought by that agency.
Various other hypotheticals could be explored but this would be an idle
exercise since it is not clear that the court itself had any sure idea of what
explicit boundaries it would eventually place on the limited waiver.12 6
An attempt to peer into the mind of the court en banc is certainly not
facilitiated by the court's rationale for finding a mere limited waiver. The
court stated: "To hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the
developing procedure of corporations to employ independent outside
counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect stockholders,
potential stockholders and customers.' 27 This is not a rationale for
limiting waiver. This is a rationale for finding the existence of the privilege
at the outset. The SEC ostensibly had nothing to do with the investigation
at its inception. The later disclosure to the SEC had nothing to do with the
investigation ab initio, but was merely a disclosure pursuant to an agency
subpoena in connection with the agency's own investigation. The court has
a strong policy argument-that of encouraging disclosure to government
agencies-but this argument offered was a non sequitur with regard to the
issue of waiver. Finding a limited waiver with regard to non-public
disclosures to the SEC encourages such disclosures and aids the
Commission, but it really has little relationship to the initial
investigation. 2
8
A subsequent development has been the consent decree between the
SEC and the Boeing Company.129 The decree attacked this problem by
establishing a Special Review Committee to review internal investigations
being conducted by Boeing, and to relay all material that is not privileged
to the SEC. 30 The Legal Times of Washington reported that:
The SEC view is that the Boeing Consent is in accord with Diversified
Industries, Inc. v. Meredith in the Eighth Circuit, that is, it adheres to a
126. Other courts have recently considered similar fact situations and have arrived at a variety of
conclusions for a variety of reasons. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224,1237 (3d Cir. 1979)
("the potential costs of undetected noncompliance are themselves high enough to ensure that corporate
officials will authorize investigations regardless of an inability to keep such investigations completely
confidential"); In re General Counsel, John Doe, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. TAX CAS. 9405 (2d
Cir. 1979) (Here there was no need to decide which version of the attorney-client privilege to use, since
the court found that anticipation of litigation allowed the use of the work product privilege.); In re
Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185, 1186 (4th Cir. 1979) ("Since Diversified did not requirejudicial intervention in
the grand jury process, we do not find it to be controlling here."); Osterneck v. E. T. Barwick Indus,,
[Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,819 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (distinguished from Diversified because
no legal services were contemplated and the investigation was not voluntary).
127. 572 F.2d at 611.
128. Note that Diversified did not deal with "Special Compliance Counsel" appointed by the
SEC. The federal district court for the District of Columbia in Securities & Exeh. Comm'n v, Canadian
Javelin Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C. 1978), has held that because special compliance counsel owes
his duty to the court and the public, no attorney-client privilege attaches to communications between
such counsel and the corporation being monitored, thus negating any notion of waiver.
129. Boeing Consent Order, No. 78-1383 (D.D.C. July 28, 1978).
130. The Legal Times of Wash., Aug. 7, 1978, at 2, col. 2.
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limited waiver interpretation of the act of filing an 8-K disclosing some
internal investigation results. SEC officials necessarily oppose the assertion of
the privilege where it would effectively block agency access and where they do
not believe that it attaches, but they recognize that a complete waiver theory
would also block disclosure; companies would balk at any disclosure for fear
of triggering a waiver of the privilege as to undisclosed information.13
2. Corporate Minutes
The inclusion of certain parts of the report in the corporate minutes
again raises the spectre of waiver, confronted in this form solely by Chief
Judge Gibson in his dissent. 32 The leading case dealing with the attorney-
client privilege in the context of shareholder derivative suits, Garner v.
Wolfinbarger,133 extended the privilege to corporate minutes except where
the shareholder demanded disclosure for "good cause."' 34 Chief Judge
Gibson suggested that this exception creates an uncertainty of confiden-
tiality which vitiates the privilege in all cases.135 He argued that the
inclusion of these excerpts in the minutes was a breach of confidentiality.
Furthermore, he claimed that publication of portions of those minutes
constituted a complete waiver of the privilege, since the privilege may not
be selectively waived.
This analysis fails on both points. The potential for disclosure
removes neither the actual nor the intentional confidentiality of the
material. The inclusion of portions of the report in the corporate minutes
may be evidence that no intention that the report remain confidential ever
existed. But this is far different from claiming that de facto confidentiality
had ceased or from claiming that this is conclusive evidence that no
intention for confidentiality existed. The potential for disclosure is not the
same as disclosure, and a calculated risk does not necessarily indicate an
ambivalence regarding the outcome of that risk. There is no reason why a
disclosure to the stockholders must vitiate the privilege toward the world
at large, if the communication is otherwise kept confidential. There is no
reason why the corporate fiction should give way to the adversary system.
Without more, stockholders and management should be presumed to have
parallel objectives in this type of situation.
Nor does the partial disclosure of those minutes that contain no
portions of the report constitute a selective or partial waiver. This analysis
fails simply because it equates the minutes with the body of information
131. Id.
132. 572 F.2d at 616. For more on the attorney-client privilege in the context ofshareholder, see
Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporation in Shareholder Litigation. SO So. CAL. L
REV. 303 (1977); Note, The Application in the Federal Courts of the Attorney- Client Privilege to the
Corporation, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 281, 293-94 (1970).
133. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
134. Id. at 1104. This showing has no relation to and should not be confused with the showingof
"substantial need" required to overcome the work product privilege.
135. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege andthe Corporation in Shareholder Litigation, 50
So. CAL. L. REv. 303, 322 (1977).
1979]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
being sought through discovery. This body of information is that which the
attorney-client privilege attempts to maintain intact to prevent one party
from exercising biased editorial control over it. Partial disclosure of the
minutes does not necessarily imply partial disclosure of the protected body
of information and thus cannot be construed as a waiver of the privilege.
13 6
Chief Judge Gibson's observation that this was not a communication
between an attorney and a client and his subsequent conclusion that this
was, therefore, not protected by the attorney-client privilege runs counter
to both precedent and the rationale for the privilege. The privilege extends
to the substance of the communications, not to the communications
themselves. 37 Intracorporate memoranda of a legal nature or dealing with
other legal communications are fully protected. 38 Interestingly enough,
this conclusion can be garnered not only from case law, but also from the
definition of the privilege used by the majority opinion-that contained in
rule 503(b)(4) of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. 39
IV. SELF-EVALUATIVE REPORT PRIVILEGE
The Diversified court's policy arguments for the application of the
attorney-client privilege in that case echo those used thirty years ago by the
Supreme Court promoting the work product privilege in Hickman v.
Taylor.1 40 The court there stated:
Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of
what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. . . . Inefficiency,
unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal
advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal
profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the
cause of justice would be poorly served.' 41
From the protection of opinions of counsel to the release of factual
material unavailable from other sources, the mechanics of the work
product privilege, and the above-quoted language, appear seductively
applicable, to certain parts of the material sought in Diversified.
Application, however, is difficult in this conlext because the work
product privilege is well-developed and codified into a set form.142 It would
have been beyond the powers of the court to apply the concrete work
136. In re Prudence-Bonds Corp., 76 F. Supp. 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1948), aIJd, 174 F.2d 288 (2d Cir,
1949). Disclosure of privileged matter relating to a particular subject is not a waiver of privileged
matter relating to other subjects. Id. at647. See UnderwaterStorage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co.,
314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970) (waiverexists when the policy behind the privilege is no longerserved).
137. United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 1964). United States v, Goldfarb, 328
F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir. 1964).
138. Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 37 (D. Md. 1974); Eutectic Corp, v.
Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 38-39 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
139. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
140. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
141. 329 U.S. at 511.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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product privilege to the situation at hand. Thus, the Eighth Circuit chose
the plastic, and explicitly noncodified, attorney-client privilege 43 to
perform a function similar to that performed by the work product
privilege.
There is, however, another privilege that addresses the problem more
specifically-with less uncertainty in its application. This alternative
approach, styled the "Self-Evaluative Report Privilege," was first
advanced in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.144 That case concerned a
malpractice suit in which plaintiff moved for production of the minutes
and reports of a hospital investigative committee whose purpose was to
improve hospital care. The court noted that confidentiality was essential to
effective functioning of the committee and the committee work was
essential to continued improvement in the care of patients. Finding that
improved care furthered a strong public policy, the court held that the
committee's deliberations should not be disclosed absent evidence of
extraordinary circumstances.
A similar rationale emerged in several cases dealing with internal
police reports such as arrest investigations and disciplinary inquiries. 14 5 In
Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 46 the court protected self-evaluative
reports of Lockheed-Georgia's equal employment and affirmative action
compliance programs. These reports included candid self-analysis and
evaluation of the company's actions in the area of equal employment
opportunity. The court concluded that to allow access to the written
opinions and conclusions of Lockheed's own evaluation staff would
discourage companies from making investigations calculated to foster
compliance with the law. 147 These policy arguments are similar to those of
the work product privilege; both privileges allow a party to uncover facts
and explore concepts concerning his affairs-actions which, although in
143. See McLaughlin, The Trearnent ofAttorney-Client and Related Pfrivileges in the Proposed
Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 26 TuE RECORD 31 (1971).
144. 50 F.R.D. 249,followed in 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970), a ff'd without opposition in 479
F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
145. Holmes v. Gardler, 62 F.R.D. 70 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Gaison v. Scott, 59 F.R.D. 347 (D.
Hawaii 1973); Ballard v. Terrak, 56 F.R.D. 45 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (police cases). See Tucson Medical
Cent., Inc. v. Misevch, 545 P.2d 958 (Ariz. 1976); Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316 (S.D. N.Y.
1971) (hospital cases). See also Stevenson v. General Electric Co., 26 FED. Ruz.S SERV. 2d 574 (S.D.
Ohio 1978) (affirmativeaction plan); NewYork Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Sloan, 22 FED. RuLEs SExv. 2d
500 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (accounting firm's audit). Other courts have been quick to distinguish the facts in
Bredice: United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978) (distinguishes tax law privileges); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978) (distinguishes
via foreknowledge); Davidson v. Light, 79 F.R.D. 137 (D. Colo. 1978) (distinguishes by function of
committee). State courts are extremely hesitant to promulgate this new privilege: Davison v. St Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 248 N.W.2d 433 (Wis. 1977) (only legislature or Supreme Court should create
privileges); Jolly v. Superior Court of Pinal County, 540 P.2d 658 (Ariz. 1975) (no privileges except in
extreme circumstances); Nazareth Literary and Benevolent Inst. v. Stephenson, 503 S.W.2d 177 (Ky.
1973) (the aim of discovery is truth).
146. 53 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
147. Cf Horizon Corp. v. FTC, 76-2 TRADE CAs. 61,155 (D.D.C. 1976) (loweradministrative
law judge, in dicta, refused to apply the privilege to a report monitoring the corporation's sales
practices, saying that its primary purpose was to improve sales).
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the public interest, would be contrary to the interest of the acting party if a
hostile party were able to discover the results.
Although the initial Eighth Circuit panel court in Diversified rejected
the work product privilege because the documents sought had not been
prepared in anticipation of litigation, the other requirements of the
privilege were met. In fact, an unexpressed difficulty in dealing with this
case lies in the similarity between the corporate investigatory activities and
activities that typically precede litigation. In both situations the
corporation invests great time and expense to uncover facts and to obtain a
legal analysis of those facts. Had the report been prepared in anticipation
of litigation, it would have been protected by the work product privilege . 48
In fact, an action directly related to this investigation and report was later
filed. Thus, timing and intent were the only factors that prevented the
application of the work product privilege.
A latent assumption of the work product privilege is that legal counsel
is contacted only upon the commission of a crime, the commencement of a
suit, or for non-routine or adversarial legal work. This assumption,
although applicable to an individual, has no relevance in the context of a
corporation; for although the counsel of a natural person does not
normally prepare before specific litigation can be anticipated, a
corporation will quite naturally maintain a preparedness for litigation-
without a specific opponent. The requirement that material produced in
anticipation of litigation be protected from discovery evolved separately
from the corporate sphere, severely limiting the usefulness of the privilege
to a corporation-particularly in cases where no specific litigation could be
anticipated.
Use of the self-evaluative privilege has several advantages over the use
oi the attorney-client privilege in this situation. First, it is limited to a
particular situation. This would allow the attorney-client privilege to
remain more narrowly defined, preventing the parade of horribles
envisioned by the court in Upjohn.149 Second, the self-evaluative privilege,
like the work product privilege, is aimed at the work of uncovering and
developing unknown facts for the client, rather than communication of
known facts between client and attorney. Thus, the objection that
corporate minutes and reports do not constitute communications would
fall by the wayside." 0 Likewise, the issue of whether various aspects of the
investigation were legal in character would need not be resolved. Third, the
self-evaluative privilege has been held to be a limited privilege-like the
work product privilege, but unlike the attorney-client privilege. A limited
privilege allows disclosure or even selective disclosure upon a showing of
substantial need and nonavailability of the material elsewhere."' Thus,
148. Diversified Indus., Inc. v Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 1978).
149. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
150. Chief Judge Gibson raised this objection. 572 F.2d at 616 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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several courts applying the self-evaluative privilege have required
production of those portions of the reports containing the facts and
withheld those portions of the reports containing the self-evaluative
conclusions.1 52 This supports discovery without exposing the client's
opinions and those of his counsel.
As a preliminary step to the application of any flexible doctrine a
court must look to the motivation and justification for the doctrine. Only
by reference to this motivation or justification may a court justly tailor a
flexible doctrine to a specific set of facts. Although the attorney-client
privilege can be expanded and correspondingly contracted by a flexible
court, it would be better policy to adopt the new self-evaluative privilege
because it specifically addresses the problem of corporate internal
investigations without the ambiguity of the tests for the attorney-client
privilege. While both privileges promote attorney-client communications
with a hopefully limited effect upon discovery, the attorney-client privilege
becomes more difficult to apply in this factual context. First, the policy
arguments encouraging application in this area have nothing to do with
whether an attorney is conducting an investigation. Second, the attorney-
client privilege is most justifiable and thus most easily tailored by rational
thought when applied to communications of management at the
discretionary decision making level. The self-evaluative report privilege is
more readily understood and more easily applied to factfinding tasks and
communications at the nondiscretionary level of the corporation because
it is tailored to these particular situations. Because of its striking similarity
to the work product privilege, pioneer cases dealing with the self-
evaluative report privilege could resolve dilemmas with reference to the
older privilege. This ease of application would doubtless result in more
uniform applications: the key ingredient to the sense of security that these
privileges are intended to foster. The attorney-client privilege is not useless
in this context. It has often been used in conjunction with the work product
privilege and so could be used with the self-evaluative privilege. The self-
evaluative privilege would provide a limited privilege for the factual
groundwork while the attorney-client privilege would provide an absolute
shield for communications laden with legal opinions. Discovery would still
be available on a showing of substantial need by the adverse party, while
the fear of full disclosure of legal considerations need never materialize.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the corporate attorney-client privilege should be applied as
narrowly with respect to subject matter as it is with an individual, it should
be applied to a broad range of individuals within the corporation. Without
this broad range of applicability the privilege becomes unusable. Without
152. See Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (statements of witnesses
concerning facts were turned over, but witnesses' evaluations of facts, conclusions, and recommen-
dations were not).
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a narrow range of applicability to subject matter, the privilege becomes
vulnerable to abuse. Due to the nature of the corporation, however, it
often becomes difficult to separate the legal subject matter from the rest.
The in camera review is always available, but the rule that the material is
prima facie of a legal nature is necessary to protect any substance that the
privilege possesses. While it is true that this rule rebels against the concept
of a narrow range of subject matter, it is necessary to maintain a balanced
view of the privilege within the corporation. Just as matters are less
confidential within the corporate sphere than in the individual's sphere, so
too are duties and interests less rigid.
Flexibility seems to be the most necessary quality for a test's
application. The control group test is much too restrictive to be usable and
much too arbitrary to bejustified. The Harper & Row test is usable, but is a
bit broad in its approach to subject matter, possibly leaving the road to
abuse unguarded. This, however, could possibly be alleviated by a
carefully-drawn definition of the privilege itself. On the other hand, by
tying the privilege to only those communications made at the order of a
superior, the court continues to refuse the privilege to many upper-level
executives acting independently within their own realm.
Presently, although the Eighth Circuit's test is ostensibly strict, the
court itself apparently feels that the test is more liberal than the control
group test. That the court would adopt this attitude has a bearing on
predicting how it will rule in the future. To work within the bounds of the
privilege, the most important consideration would seem to be that no one
communicate with a lawyer without orders from above. Once compliance
with that factor is established, waiver will most likely grudgingly arise. In
the context of self-evaluation, even without a nominal self-evaluative
privilege, the Eighth Circuit seems willing to make an actual self-evaluative
privilege out of the attorney-client privilege. Thus, although the privilege
itself appears somewhat rigid in conception, it likely would prove flexible
in .practice.
Unfortunately, although flexibility is desired by the court at the time
of application, infallibility is desired by the corporation at the time of
communication. The latent obstruction to the resolution of the conflicting
goals of discovery and privilege lies in the discrete nature of the attorney-
client privilege. The court is thus confronted with the unfortunate dilemma
of totally rejecting the pleas of one party or the other. The system needs a
privilege that will allow a court flexibility, yet not threaten a corporation
with total exposure of its confidential legal communications.
A court could construct a special privilege to allow a corporation,
various officers, and subdivisions to conduct self-purging activities that
would be considered wholly apart from other legal activities. Though this
privilege could be abused, as might the attorney-client privilege, the
circumstances in which the privilege would be plausibly applicable would
be substantially more limited than for the attorney-client privilege. At the
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same time, the attorney-client privilege could again be narrowed without
fear of harming the altruistic corporation.
The optimal solution for this fact situation would be a double-tiered
privilege. On a broad level, the self-evaluative report privilege would allow
a corporation, various officers, and subdivisions to conduct self-purging
activities that would be considered wholly apart from other legal activities.
Because of its breadth, however, the privilege would be qualified like the
work product privilege. At the second level, the attorney-client privilege
would be an absolute shield for a narrowly construed set of legal
communications. Thus, the set of privileged materials would be expanded
without absolute foreclosure of discovery, while the attorney-client
privilege could again be narrowed without fear of harming the altruistic
corporation.
The issue of waiver has been handled in the only way reasonable. The
SEC needs to pursue its activities relatively unhampered if it is to work
effectively. Likewise, it is difficult to see how a corporation could ever
assert the privilege for any matter of great importance when inclusion of
such matter in the minutes-which are required to be kept by statute-
would waive the privilege. The allowance of the privilege in such cases does
no violence to the motives behind the privilege, as long as the
confidentiality intentionally remains intact.
It is almost trite to say that this opinion engendered more questions
than it resolved. The court never explicitly adopted a definition of the
privilege that it used. If the assumption is to be drawn that Proposed
Federal Rule 503 was to be used in this capacity, the court never resolved
the explicit conflicts with that rule and the various other tests the court
used, nor in particular with the court's exclusion of the fortuitous witness.
The court never specified what was meant by "limited waiver." The court
did not differentiate between the effects of the privilege upon admissibility
and those upon discovery. In particular it did not specify which sources are
accessible and which are privileged. This was all in addition to the
seemingly loose application of strict limitations to the extent that at least
one judge dissented solely on factual grounds.
The approach of the court is good in one respect-that is, the client
who communicates with an attorney in good faith should not be compelled
to reveal those confidences in court. The corporate client that com-
municates wholly internal matters to an attorney for the sake of legal
advice should also expect these confidences to remain inviolate. The
danger of intentionally shielding otherwise nonprivileged matter, solely
for the purpose of that shield, has little real relationship to the standard a
court uses for testing for the existence of the corporate attorney-client
relationship. Ultimately, then, the question is either one of confidentiality
or one of admissibility. The first question is easily resolved: Does the
opposing party have a copy of the material sought or might it have
obtained such at some past point in time? This question was left to the trial
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court. The question of admissibility was not addressed. The court did say,
however, that: (1) communications to legal advisors for the purpose of
improved compliance with the law will be deemed of a legal nature and for
legal advice; and (2) confidential disclosures to law enforcement agencies
may remain as privileged as those agencies wish to keep them. It is not clear
that this is an earth-shaking result, but it does bring compliance with the
law into the limelight as an element in favor of the privilege.
Clyde C. Kahrl
